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Companion memos

M·01End-Game PlanM·02Ørsted Offshore ServicesM·03Ørsted TechnologyM·04Appendix D · Competitive Landscape

Contents

ØCompanion Memo M·02 — May 2026·Two-Entity Business Model · Part 1

ØrstedOffshoreServices

A professional services and IP licensing business — boutique advisory commercial logic, structurally superior because Ørsted has actually done what it advises others to do, at fleet scale, for three decades.

3

service lines

189–580

mDKK at maturity

16–22

FTE at maturity

5–10

parallel client relationships

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CaCaO — O&M AdvisoryØDeep Push — Site CharacterisationØBulu Bulu — EPC AdvisoryØRetainers · Royalties · SubscriptionsØCaCaO — O&M AdvisoryØDeep Push — Site CharacterisationØBulu Bulu — EPC AdvisoryØRetainers · Royalties · SubscriptionsØCaCaO — O&M AdvisoryØDeep Push — Site CharacterisationØBulu Bulu — EPC AdvisoryØRetainers · Royalties · SubscriptionsØ
§ 01Positioning

A professional services
and IP licensing business.

The analogy

Wood Group's offshore advisory practice. Xodus Group. Specialist operators selling earned operational expertise — except Ørsted has run the world's largest offshore wind fleet.

Ørsted Offshore Services operates on the same commercial logic as a boutique strategy consultancy or a specialist engineering advisory firm — except its competitive advantage is not people alone, but the proprietary data, validated methodology, and earned operational know-how built from running the world's largest offshore wind fleet.

The business serves multiple external clients simultaneously, running several engagements in parallel. Revenue combines predictable annual retainers (cash flow stability) with variable project fees and licence income (upside). From Year 2 it should be managing 5–10 active client relationships concurrently.

  • ACaCaO — O&M Performance Advisory. Tiered diagnostic → implementation → retainer → subscription.
  • BDeep Push — Site Characterisation Licensing. Front-loaded IP, back-loaded royalty.
  • CBulu Bulu — EPC Advisory. Conditional on 60-day external market assessment.
§ 02Service Line A — CaCaO

Fleet-scale data,
productised as advisory.

Ørsted's O&M team has more performance data, more failure mode experience, and more optimisation iterations than any other offshore wind operator. CaCaO packages that institutional knowledge into a tiered engagement structure — diagnostic sprint as the door-opener, retainer as the anchor.

Engagement Types & Pricing

Engagement
Description
Pricing
Duration
Revenue Scale

Diagnostic Sprint

6–8 week O&M health check. Benchmark client fleet against proprietary dataset. Deliverable: performance gap report + prioritised action list.
3–5 mDKK fixed fee
6–8 weeks
Y1: 1–2 / Maturity: 8–12 per year

Implementation Program

6–12 month advisory engagement following sprint. Ørsted advisors embedded with client team. Fixed monthly + performance bonus.
5–15 mDKK fixed + 10–20% success fee
6–12 months
Y1: 0–1 / Maturity: 4–6 per year

Annual Advisory Retainer

Standing client relationship. Quarterly benchmarking, methodology updates, ad-hoc support, priority access to new releases.
3–8 mDKK / yr per client
Rolling 12-month
Y1: 0 / Maturity: 10–15 active

Digital Access Subscription

Once CaCaO methodology is productised, clients pay an annual SaaS-style subscription for data access and reporting. Year 3+.
1–3 mDKK / yr
Subscription (Year 3+)
Maturity: 20–40 subs

Stage 01

Entry

Diagnostic Sprint. Low commitment. 3–5 mDKK for a structured benchmarking exercise. The door-opener.

Stage 02

Deepening

Implementation Program. Client has seen the gap and wants to close it. Success fee aligns incentives.

Stage 03

Anchoring

Annual Retainer. Client is now dependent on Ørsted's methodology for quarterly benchmarking.

Stage 04

Scale

Digital Subscription. Tool-led, not advisor-led. Lower resource cost, higher margin, broader reach.

Target Customer Segments — CaCaO (mDKK)

Segment
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
At Maturity

Est. European OFW Operators

8–15
22–55
40–90
75–150 — RWE, Vattenfall, SSE, Equinor, bp, Iberdrola. Largest volume.

Infrastructure Funds with OFW

0–3
5–15
12–30
25–60 — Macquarie, Brookfield, CIP, PensionDanmark. High willingness to pay.

Emerging Market Operators

0–3
5–15
10–30
20–50 — South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, India. Project-based to retainer.

CaCaO Total

8–21
32–85
62–150
120–260 mDKK / yr (base–high)
§ 03Service Line B — Deep Push

Passive, high-margin licensing — at industry scale.

Once the IP is documented and validated, Deep Push is a passive, high-margin licensing business. Work is front-loaded — IP documentation, legal protection, JIP Phase II — and revenue is back-loaded as licensees deploy the methodology across their surveys globally.

Market sizing

30,000–50,000 geotechnical surveys required globally over the next decade. Even capturing 5% at 750k DKK per survey generates 1.1–1.9 bnDKK in total licence revenue.

Engagement Types & Pricing — Deep Push

Engagement
Description
Pricing
Duration
Revenue Scale

Per-Survey IP Licence

Client pays a per-deployment fee each time the Deep Push CPTU methodology is used. Per site, per survey campaign.
0.5–1.5 mDKK per survey
Per deployment (passive)
Y1: 5–10 / Maturity: 80–150 per year

JIP Participation Fee

Joint Industry Program with 5–10 participants co-funding continued methodology development. Early access + reduced royalty.
5–10 mDKK per JIP round, per participant
12–18 month rounds
Y1: 1 JIP / Maturity: 2–3 JIPs running

Training & Certification

Certification courses for survey firms wanting to train teams on the methodology. Priced per cohort.
0.5–1 mDKK per cohort
3–5 days
Y2+: 2–4 / Maturity: 6–10 cohorts

Bespoke Survey Service

Where no certified local survey firms exist, Ørsted delivers the survey directly. Higher revenue, resource-intensive.
3–8 mDKK per project
4–12 weeks
Y2+: 2–4 projects / year

Target Customer Segments — Deep Push (mDKK)

Segment
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
At Maturity

Geotech Survey Firms

2–8
8–20
15–40
40–90 — Fugro, NGI, COWI, Boskalis. Distribution channel.

Developers in Constrained Markets

1–5
5–15
10–25
20–50 — US, Taiwan, India. Bespoke → licensed local firms.

Sovereign Energy Agencies

0
2–5
5–12
10–25 — Programme commissioning baseline surveys.

Deep Push Total

3–13
15–40
30–77
70–165 mDKK / yr (base–high)
§ 04Service Line C — Bulu Bulu

EPC Advisory — conditional on market assessment.

The decision

60-day external assessment will determine whether Bulu Bulu's EPC innovations are genuinely licensable — or internal process improvements with limited external appeal.

If confirmed externally valuable, the engagement model is project-based advisory and specialist sub-contracting — distinct from CaCaO's retainer model. Engagements are larger in value, fewer in number, tied to specific project execution cycles.

If the assessment concludes no external market: Bulu Bulu reverts to the core EPC innovation funnel. Ørsted Offshore Services continues with CaCaO and Deep Push only.

Engagement Types — Bulu Bulu (if confirmed)

Engagement
Description
Pricing
Duration
Revenue Scale

Execution Methodology Advisory

Review of client's EPC execution plan. Identify efficiency gaps. Recommend Bulu Bulu-derived improvements. Scoped to a specific phase.
2–5 mDKK per engagement
8–16 weeks
Y2+: 2–4 / Maturity: 5–8 per year

Specialist Sub-contracting

Specialist team deployed for offshore installation planning, logistics optimisation, interface management. Larger, longer engagements.
10–30 mDKK per project
6–18 months
Y2+: 1–2 / Maturity: 3–5 per year
§ 05Combined Revenue & FTE

The shape of the
services entity.

Revenue Summary by Year (mDKK)

Line
Y1
Y2
Y3
At Maturity

CaCaO — Diagnostic Sprints

3–15
10–25
15–30
24–60

CaCaO — Implementation Programs

5–15
10–30
20–45
20–90

CaCaO — Annual Retainers

0
6–16
24–48
30–120

CaCaO — Digital Subscriptions

0
0
0–6
20–60

Deep Push — Survey Licences

2–10
7–20
15–40
40–120

Deep Push — JIP Fees

5–10
5–10
10–20
10–25

Deep Push — Training + Bespoke

0–3
2–8
5–15
20–40

Bulu Bulu Advisory (conditional)

0
2–8
8–25
25–65

TOTAL — Offshore Services

15–53
42–117
97–229
189–580

Operating costs (FTE + overhead)

(25–35)
(35–50)
(50–70)
(70–110)

EBIT

(10–18)
7–67
47–159
119–470

FTE Model — Ørsted Offshore Services

Role
Y1
Y2
Y3
Maturity

Managing Director

1
1
1
1 — External or senior internal. P&L mandate.

CaCaO Lead Advisor

1
1
1
1 — Internal secondment, senior Innovation PM.

CaCaO Delivery Advisors

1–2
2–4
3–5
5–8 — Mix of secondments + external hires.

Deep Push Licence Manager

1
1
1
1 — Internal. Minimal once IP documented.

Commercial / BD

1
2
3
4–5 — External. Energy sector + IP licensing.

Legal / Contracts

0.5
1
1
1–2 — External law firm + internal coordinator.

Finance / Operations

0.5
1
1
1–2 — P&L, reporting, contract admin.

Bulu Bulu (if confirmed)

0
1
2
3 — EPC advisory specialists, external.

TOTAL FTE

6–8
10–13
13–15
16–22

Est. cost (mDKK / yr)

25–35
35–50
50–70
70–110
“

Year 1 revenue is deliberately conservative — the first 6 months are spent on the internal pilot to generate the case study needed for credible external sales.

§ 06The Cannibalization Problem

The first-order
design question.

This is the structural tension that must be resolved before Ørsted Services can be formed. Not a secondary risk — a first-order design question that determines whether the entity helps or hurts Ørsted's core business.

6.1 — Arguments for and against

ForCreates new revenue not tied to OFW build-out.

RiskInternal mark-up erodes bid competitiveness. BUs buying at market rates pay a margin their competitors do not. Ørsted's LCOE increases.

ForDiversifies Ørsted's revenue base in scenarios where core margins compress or build rates slow.

RiskCompetitive intelligence leakage. Licensing methods to other developers teaches them how Ørsted builds. Once licensed, the advantage diffuses permanently.

ForExternal validation accelerates development. Paying external customers prove the technology faster and more honestly than internal pilots.

RiskConflict of interest: customers are competitors. Other OFW developers may refuse to buy, or use the relationship to extract intelligence.

ForScales innovations Ørsted cannot absorb alone. Lime's development cost is only justifiable if deployed at scale — which requires external customers.

RiskTraining the market at Ørsted's expense. A well-capitalised competitor buys the licence, scales it faster, and out-competes Ørsted in the same markets.

ForØrsted uses it first — always. If every technology is deployed on Ørsted's fleet before licensing, competitors receive yesterday's version. Permanent deployment lead.

RiskBU bypass risk. If Ørsted Services is perceived as expensive or slow, BUs will procure externally — undermining both the entity's revenue AND the internal case study.

ForForces internal pricing discipline. If BUs pay market rates, they must accurately value the innovation. Free internal access historically leads to under-use.

RiskTransfer pricing regulatory exposure. Pricing between a standalone entity and Ørsted BUs will be scrutinised by tax authorities. Requires formal policy.

6.2 — Resolution

Four structural mitigants. All required.

The cannibalization risk is manageable — but only if the following four mechanisms are formally agreed before the entity is formed. These are prerequisites, not optional design features.

Mitigant 01

Dual-pricing policy

Ørsted BUs buy at cost-plus (e.g. cost + 10%). External customers pay full market rates. The entity builds margin only from external revenue. Internal BU costs are no higher than if Ørsted had developed the capability in-house.

Solves — Eliminates internal mark-up cannibalization. BUs are not penalised for using Ørsted Services.

Mitigant 02

IP tiering framework

Tier 1 (structural advantage — e.g. Lime core foundation architecture): never licensed, Ørsted-only. Tier 2 (operational improvements with 24+ month deployment lead): licensed after Ørsted has deployed. Tier 3 (mature / commoditised): open licensing.

Solves — Prevents leakage on the IP that drives Ørsted's cost advantage. Limits external licensing to IP Ørsted has already extracted full value from.

Mitigant 03

Competitor licensing restriction

No licensing of Tier 1 or Tier 2 IP to the top 8 direct OFW competitors (RWE, Vattenfall, bp offshore, etc.) without explicit GET approval. Define the restricted list at entity formation. License freely to non-competing sectors (O&G, sovereign agencies, emerging-market developers).

Solves — Addresses the customer–competitor conflict. Creates defensible customer segmentation that protects core competitiveness.

Mitigant 04

First-deployment right

Ørsted has a contractual right, embedded in the entity's founding documents, to deploy every technology on its own fleet before any external party. Minimum 18-month exclusivity window per capability. After exclusivity expires, external licensing opens.

Solves — Ensures Ørsted always has a competitive deployment lead. Competitors receive yesterday's version, not today's.

“

A dual-pricing policy + IP tiering + competitor licensing restriction + first-deployment right, agreed before formation, eliminates the structural tension. Without all four, the entity will erode what it is meant to create.

Ørsted Offshore ServicesØThree Lines · One EntityØCompanion Memo M·02ØEnd of Part 1ØØrsted Offshore ServicesØThree Lines · One EntityØCompanion Memo M·02ØEnd of Part 1ØØrsted Offshore ServicesØThree Lines · One EntityØCompanion Memo M·02ØEnd of Part 1Ø