Ø

Companion memos

M·01End-Game PlanM·02Ørsted Offshore ServicesM·03Ørsted TechnologyM·04Appendix D · Competitive Landscape

Contents

ØAppendix D · M·04 — May 2026·Competitive Landscape Assessment

Asectorfirst,withnoplaybooktocopy.

No offshore wind developer has yet built a formal IP licensing or standalone commercialization entity for operational technology. Ørsted’s framework is a genuine first-mover move — with 24–36 months of lead before peers could replicate.

7

companies analysed

6

vehicle archetypes

3

structural gaps

24–36 mo

first-mover window

Scroll
Ørsted · RWE · VattenfallØEquinor · BP · Shell · CIPØGE Vernova — industrial benchmarkØStandalone IP entity — sector firstØØrsted · RWE · VattenfallØEquinor · BP · Shell · CIPØGE Vernova — industrial benchmarkØStandalone IP entity — sector firstØØrsted · RWE · VattenfallØEquinor · BP · Shell · CIPØGE Vernova — industrial benchmarkØStandalone IP entity — sector firstØ
§ 01Purpose & Scope

Three questions, one benchmark.

Q1

Standard model?

What is the standard model for organising an offshore wind developer, and how does Ørsted compare?

Q2

Peer commercialisation?

How do peers handle technology and IP commercialisation — and have any built dedicated vehicles for it?

Q3

Strategic implication?

What do the two proposed entities (Offshore Services + Technology) mean relative to these benchmarks?

§ 02Section 2 — Snapshot

Seven peers. One pure-play.

FY2025 disclosures · Installed OFW, revenue scale, BU count, innovation vehicle

Company
Model
OFW (GW)
Revenue FY25
BUs / Segments
Innovation Vehicle

Ørsted

Developer-operator
10.2 + 8.1 u/c
DKK 77B
2 functional (Commercial · EPC & Ops)
Propel + Ventures & Open Innovation

RWE

Diversified utility
~3.5
€25.8B
5 segments
RWE Technology International (within Flex Gen)

Vattenfall

State-owned utility
~3.0
SEK 218B
5 BAs
Vattenfall Innovation (network, no vehicle)

Equinor

Oil major in transition
~2.0 (floating + fixed)
USD 28B (renew.)
New Power BA (2025) + E&P
Equinor Ventures (CVC) + Innovation Hub

BP

Oil major — exiting OFW
~1.0 (divested)
USD 48B
JERA Nex BP JV (50:50, 2025)
None (asset exit only)

CIP

Pure fund manager
120 pipeline (not operated)
€35B AUM
15 funds, single MgmtCo
N/A — not a tech developer

Shell

Oil major — scaling back
<0.5
USD 35B
Power Gen + Trading (2025 split)
None dedicated to OFW
“

Ørsted is the only pure-play offshore wind developer in this group. Every other peer is structurally non-comparable — diversified, retreating, or a fund manager.

§ 03Section 3 — BU Architecture

The H3 problem is industry-wide.

Structural dimensions across the four developer-operators

Dimension
Ørsted
RWE
Vattenfall
Equinor

Organising logic

Functional (post-2025)
Business line / tech
Market & technology
Energy type + value chain

Innovation mandate

Central team + Propel
Embedded in BUs + RTI
Internal network, no commercial mandate
Equinor Ventures + Hywind

Tech spinout precedent

None (Propel ≠ spinout)
RTI — within segment
None
Hywind wholly owned

Services arm

None (proposed)
RTI (EPC + advisory)
Heat-as-a-Service in C&S
No external services unit

IP licensing model

None
Blade/cabling — not as biz model
None
Hywind not externally licensed

Governance of H3 bets

Innovation team + MD Ventures
Embedded in BUs
Centrally absorbed or dropped
Ventures CVC + BU incubation
Across all five developer-operators, none has solved the H3 governance problem. Transformative bets are either absorbed too early into BUs (killing them with short-term P&L pressure) or persist in innovation teams without a credible path to market. The failure mode is structural, not project-specific.
§ 04Section 4 — Vehicles

Six archetypes. Only one matches.

Vehicles found in the market · H-focus · P&L responsibility

Vehicle
Example
H-focus
P&L
Structural Assessment

External Accelerator

Ørsted Propel · Equinor/BP Hub
H1 ◯ H3 ◯
No
Good for PR & ecosystem; does not move internal IP to market.

Corporate Venture Capital

Equinor Ventures · Vattenfall InVentions
H3 ●
Financial only
Captures H3 externally; does not commercialise Ørsted IP.

Internal Innovation Network

Ørsted V&OI · Vattenfall Innovation
H1/H3 partial
No
Easy to stand up; scouting, not delivery.

Consulting / EPC arm (in segment)

RWE Technology International
H1 ●
Within parent
Most common delivery model. Works for services, hard for IP licensing.

JV / Asset Divestiture

BP × JERA Nex BP
H1 ●
Shared
Balance-sheet move, not IP commercialisation.

Standalone IP/Tech Entity

GE Vernova · Wintershall
H3 ●
Independent
Exactly what Ørsted proposes — does not yet exist in the OFW peer group.
“

The standalone IP/technology entity model does not exist in the peer offshore wind developer group. GE Vernova — spun from GE in April 2024 at a USD 100B+ market cap — is the closest industrial analogue.

§ 05Section 5 — Shifts

Three shifts reshaping the field.

Shift 01

Oil majors exiting — capability vacuum

BP into JERA Nex BP. Shell scaling back. Supply chain relationships, engineering talent and knowledge networks are coming free. Ørsted can absorb this — only with a commercialisation vehicle in place.

Shift 02

Equinor's Power BA — system thinking

The 2025 Power BA integrates renewables, flex gen, storage and trading. A move from managing assets to managing the energy system — done internally. Ørsted proposes the same logic, externally, via standalone entities.

Shift 03

GE Vernova — the spinout template

Equipment + LTSAs + software licensing + consulting, packaged as a standalone company with its own capital markets story. USD 100B+ at IPO. Identical revenue model to what Ørsted Technology proposes for Lime and Halø.Gen.

§ 06Section 6 — Gap

Six capabilities, three real gaps.

Norm · Today · Proposed · Assessment

Capability
Norm
Today
Proposed
McKinsey Assessment

External advisory / IP licensing

Rare
None
Yes
Pioneering. 24–36 month first-mover lead. No sector template.

BU handover for H1

Standard
Weak
Partial
Universal struggle. 'Handover' is not a mechanism — must specify.

H3 standalone entity

None
None
Yes
No direct peer. GE Vernova is the analogue. 18-month gate is premature.

Dual-use IP governance

None
None
Partial
Unique to Ørsted (developer + IP holder). Tiering correct, not operational.

Consulting / services arm

Emerging
None
Yes
RWE RTI is segment-embedded. Ørsted standalone is more ambitious.

CVC / venture arm

Common
Partial
Not proposed
Equinor & Vattenfall standard. Add as third instrument.
§ 07Section 7 — Where to move

Demand × readiness. Sequencing is the strategy.

← Market demand →
← Org. readiness→

Move Now

Deep Push IP Licensing

Geotechnical survey methodology

IP is production-ready. Demand from non-competing geotechnical firms is real. No internal capability gap. Best near-term revenue candidate.

Market demand

Confirmed

Org. readiness

Production-grade

§ 08Section 8 — Implications

Five findings that reframe the case.

§ 09Section 9 — Adjustments

Five edits to the framework before the GET meeting.

Adjustment 01

Stage Offshore Services — embedded first

Two-stage: 24–36 months as embedded operations team building external revenue; carve out as standalone once external revenue clears DKK 50–100M/yr.

Adjustment 02

Prioritise Deep Push — fastest to revenue

Highest combination of IP maturity and addressable external market. Make it the Year-1 priority. A first external licence validates the entire framework.

Adjustment 03

Define the H2 pathway

Most visible weakness vs peer practice. Every GET member has experienced H2 death-by-handover. Pick one option from the framework and fund it before presenting.

Adjustment 04

Frame as a market-shaping move

Not an operational improvement — a new revenue stream that does not yet exist in the sector, enabled by 30 years of accumulated operational IP no other player has.

Bottom line

Ørsted has a 24–36 month window before peers can replicate. Move now or surrender first-mover.